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Abstract 
 In S v Molefe the presiding officer determines the meaning of the 
word "disposal" at the hand of two criteria, namely visibility and  
permanence; this means a body has to be permanently out of 
sight to be considered disposed of. He applies these two criteria 
in order to conclude if the accused is guilty of concealing the 
birth of her child by disposing of its body. In doing so, the court 
no longer interprets the word as an everyday word but turns it 
into a legal term. This note questions the linguistic soundness of 
the criteria by investigating how language structures space, and 
how these constructions relate to the word "disposal". In order to 
scrutinise the criteria, a text analysis was carried out by applying 
Talmy's ideas surrounding prepositions in structuring space and 
movement. Connected to this is the semantic difference 
between the words "seeing" and "looking": seeing is a sensory 
act, whereas looking is a cognitive one. In keeping with the 
contested word's status as a legal term, the difference between 
seeing and looking aids in formulating two new criteria. Courts 
may consider assessing whether disposal took place on the 
grounds of containment and movement; for instance, has the 
body been moved from one location to another and is the body 
being contained within another object like a bucket, a wooden 
box or a suitcase?  
Keywords 
Attempt; concealment of birth, disposal; dispose of; disposed; 
looking; ordinary meaning; seeing; space in language; 
uncompleted attempt. 
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1 Introduction 
Where do people generally dump bodies, especially if they are trying to hide 
them from the authorities? If the most widely used corpus of English, the 
Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA),1 is anything to go by, 
bodies are disposed of everywhere. When we study the collocates "dispose" 
and "body" (as lexemes)2 and pay attention to location, the 132 tokens offer 
the following possibilities: bodies of water (swamps, oceans, lakes), hefty or 
plastic bags, open spaces (fields, forests, the beach, vacant land and 
remote spots), trash cans, dumpsters, Styrofoam coolers, or they can be 
tossed somewhere "over the railing". Equally interesting is the fact that 
many bodies are wrapped in a blanket prior to disposal, at least in what we 
can tell from the COCA results. How is this different from a South African 
reality? Not much, apparently. When scrutinising a number of local cases, 
the bodies of the deceased are dealt with in a similar fashion. Bodies have 
been left in the bush,3 in a shallow grave,4 in a remote place,5 in an alley 
between houses,6 in an overturned vehicle,7 at sea,8 inside a manhole,9 
inside a lion enclosure,10 in small bottles and a bowl,11 and even covered 
with grass.12 The concealment of a baby's dead body in a bucket does not 
seem much out of place, then, as was the case in S v Molefe13 (hereafter 
Molefe). 
The use of corpora to aid in determining the ordinary meaning of words (and 
other legal-linguistic issues) is becoming commonplace.14 Consisting of 
                                            
* Terrence R Carney. BA (Hons) MA (UP) PhD (UFS). Senior lecturer, Department of 
Afrikaans and Theory of Literature, College of Human Sciences, University of South 
Africa. E-mail: carnetr@unisa.ac.za. 
1  Brigham Young University 2017 https://corpus.byu.edu/coca/. 
2  A lexeme is a single word that can take different morphological forms, for instance 
the word "run" takes the forms "runs", "ran" and "running". The word "disposal" is 
dealt with in the same way and includes the forms "dispose", "disposed", "disposing" 
and "disposable".  
3  S v Mooi 1990 1 SACR 592 (A) 593; S v Mamba 1990 1 SACR 277 (A) 229. 
4  S v Cele 1991 1 SACR 627 (A) 628; S v Roberts 2000 2 SACR 522 (SCA) 522. 
5  S v Kleynhans 1994 1 SACR 195 (O) 195. 
6  S v Terblanche 2011 1 SACR 77 (ECG) para D. 
7  S v Mofokeng 1992 2 SACR 710 (A) paras F and G.  
8  S v Nair 1993 1 SACR 451 (A) 451. 
9  S v Roberts 2000 2 SACR 522 (SCA) 522. 
10  S v Scott-Crossley 2008 1 SACR 223 (SCA) para F.  
11  S v Shabalala 1991 2 SACR 478 (A) 478. 
12  S v M 1998 1 SACR 47 (O) 49.  
13  S v Molefe 2012 2 SACR 574 (GNP) paras 2 and 6. 
14  Woolls 2003 Forensic Linguistics 102-112; Blackwell 2009 Comparative 
Legilinguistics 5-19; Mouritsen 2010 BYULR 1915-1980; Mouritsen 2011 CSTLR 
156-205; Cotterill "How to Use Corpus Linguistics" 578-590; Solan 2016 YLJF 57-
64; Solan and Gales 2016 IJLD 253-276; Vogel, Hamann and Gauer 2017 
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more than 520 million words and containing texts that range from the written 
(fiction, news reports, academic contributions) to the spoken, which includes 
reports on South Africa, COCA does give some idea of the ordinary 
meanings reasonable English speakers assign to words.15 For the purpose 
of this contribution, one of the conclusions we can draw from the COCA 
results and examples taken from case law concerning the disposal of 
bodies, within the parameters of its ordinary meaning, is that a body does 
not need to be placed completely out of sight to be disposed of. Sometimes 
bodies are left in public spaces and are therefore easily found. We can also 
infer that the place of disposal can be of a temporary nature. 
To dispose of something means that you want to get rid of it and that you 
want to free yourself of something, for instance a problem – like a dead 
body.16 The meaning of the word neither implies permanence nor does it 
prescribe location. If a body was dumped in an open veld, it was not 
necessarily the disposer's intention to place it out of sight permanently, but 
rather to simply rid him/herself of a problem. The word "dispose" 
furthermore alludes to the acts of hiding and concealing.  
In 2012 the Molefe17 case offered an alternative interpretation of the lexeme 
"dispose", based on opinions in R v Dema18 and R v Smith,19 (hereafter 
Dema and Smith) which seem to form the legal principle for such cases. 
Amongst other problems, the law report questions when disposal is 
successfully executed. It offers two criteria, namely a measure of 
permanence and visibility.20 In other words, a body is effectively disposed 
of when it lies in its intended place and is completely out of sight, rather than 
                                            
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/lsi.12305. This is not restricted to 
literature, but can be seen in a few cases too. The following state and federal cases 
in the United States have either made use of typical corpus linguistic techniques or 
they have explicitly referred to corpus linguistics as a method of interpreting ordinary 
meaning: State v Rasabout (2015 UT 72, 356 P 3rd 1258), People v Harris (72 Ill 2nd 
16377 NE 2nd 28, 1978 Ill 17 Ill Dec 838) and United States v Costello (666 F 3rd 
1040 (2012)). See furthermore Lee and Mouritsen 2017 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/08/11/the-path-
forward-for-law-and-corpus-linguistics/?tid=ss_mail&utm_term=.e4f45b62d59f. 
15  Granted, of course, a South African corpus of English would be better suited for 
South African language queries. Such corpora are currently not publicly accessible. 
16  See the definitions for "dispose of" in Dictionary Unit for SAE 2007 South African 
Concise Oxford Dictionary 335 and "ontslae raak" in Odendal and Gouws 
Handwoordeboek 801.  
17  S v Molefe 2012 (2) SACR 574 (GNP) (hereafter Molefe). 
18  R v Dema 1947 1 SA 599 (E) (hereafter Dema). 
19  R v Smith 1918 CPD 260 (hereafter Smith). 
20  Molefe para 7. 
TR CARNEY  PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  4 
being there "for all to see".21 Snyman22 confirms this when he states that 
when people can find the body again, it has not been duly disposed of. 
These criteria do not wholly correspond with the ordinary meaning 
suggested above, and phrases like "intended place", "not for all to see" and 
"when people can find the body again" are vague; as a result, they may 
create more problems than they solve. For instance, does the permanence 
of a resting place apply only to officially recognised interment sites and 
locations used by criminals with the sole intention that the body never be 
found? It occurs often enough that innocent parties happen upon a body, 
either shortly after or years after it was dumped. Once the body has been 
discovered, is its status of disposal then revoked because someone found 
it? 
Pittman JP is quite adamant in Dema that to place a body "on the floor or 
on a table or bed"23 does not constitute disposal, because anyone entering 
that room can see it. Yet in the case brought before Pittman JP the child's 
corpse had been placed inside a wooden box that had a lid on it. If it were 
not for the blood trail leading to the box, the accused's roommate would 
most likely not have known about the body's whereabouts, and this could 
have given the accused enough time to dispose of it somewhere else in a 
more permanent location. When looking at this from a linguistic perspective, 
it is important to pay attention to the prepositions used in describing 
locations and actions. Pittman JP refers to the body "on" the floor, "on" the 
table, "on" the bed, whereas the body was "in" the box. In Smith, the body 
was "in" the suitcase and the same applies to Molefe; the body was "in" the 
bucket. The prepositions "on" and "in" tell us something about the spaces 
involved, and how speakers perceive and interpret them.24 These scenarios 
invoke two different verbs, such as seeing and looking. We see an object 
that lies on top of a surface and we look at what is inside a container. The 
language involved reveals something more than what can simply be seen 
or found.  
This brings me to the purpose of the present contribution, which is first to 
consider the court's given criteria, and second to determine whether a 
linguistic perspective can shed new light on the meaning of the lexeme 
"dispose" within its context. Lastly, the aim is to consider other possible 
                                            
21  Molefe para 7. 
22  Snyman Strafreg 432. 
23  Dema para 4. 
24  The preposition "in" is often described in terms of containment and inclusion, 
whereas "on" is about surface contact between two objects; see Feist 2010 "Inside 
In and On" 95-114.  
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criteria in service of the interpretation of the contested word's meaning. As 
a legal-linguistic (and specifically a forensic-semantic) issue is at the heart 
of this note, I will limit myself to the identified language aspects of the case 
and not endeavour to criticise the court's overall decision or the legal 
principles underlying the judgement. Readers should rather see this 
contribution as a linguistic thought experiment which aims to expand on the 
existing interpretation of the disposal and concealment of a body as a 
statutory offence.  
The note is divided into the following sections: at first, the facts of the case 
relevant to this discussion are provided. This is followed by a consideration 
of what the word "attempt" means. Thereafter, I look at Talmy's ideas on 
how language structures space, and their consequence for the court's given 
criteria. The last part of this contribution focuses on the lexeme "dispose" 
as a legal term, and the new criteria that may improve its current definition. 
I employ a text analytical methodology to come to my conclusions.  
2 Facts of the case 
The accused, an adult female, gave birth prematurely, resulting in the 
baby’s being born dead. She was subsequently convicted in the Bloemhof 
district on a charge of contravening section 113(2) and (3) of the General 
Law Amendment Act 46 of 1935, which prohibits the unlawful concealment 
of the birth of a child and the (attempted) disposal of its body. The accused 
voluntarily pleaded guilty of lying to the nurse about the dead child and 
confessed her intention to attempt to dispose of its body. She had been 
confronted by police and forced to show them where the body was kept, and 
had therefore not been able to affect her plan. The body had been kept in a 
bucket at the accused's house. Though the accused was found guilty by the 
Bloemhof Magistrate's Court, the case was sent for special review due to 
the fact that the Director of Public Prosecutions had given verbal permission 
to prosecute instead of written notification. On review, Rabie J addressed 
not only the issue of verbal/written permission, but also attended to the 
question whether a stillborn baby qualifies as a child and whether the 
accused actually disposed of or attempted to dispose of its body, based on 
the criteria of permanence and visibility. The conviction was set aside.  
3 An issue of attempt 
Though the presiding officer never defines the word "attempt", he clearly 
distinguishes between the disposal of a body and an attempted disposal. 
According to Rabie J, neither a disposal nor an attempted disposal took 
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place.25 If neither activity took place, the implication is that the accused did 
nothing. Yet the baby had not crawled into the bucket by itself. The body's 
location implies that it was placed there by someone, in this case the 
accused. This furthermore implies that steps were followed as part of an 
initial attempt to dispose of the body.  
The word "attempt" means that a person tries to reach a certain goal. The 
Oxford English Dictionary defines it as "a putting forth of effort to accomplish 
what is uncertain or difficult"; the word is also contrasted with "the attainment 
of its object".26 The word furthermore entails that the attempter has either 
not done this specific deed before or that he or she had not succeeded 
during the previous challenge. Once the attempter reaches the intended 
goal, the act is no longer known/seen as an attempt, but as a completed 
task. This is obvious when studying the applicable antonym: "success". It 
may happen that a person has to try more than once to complete a task. 
Each try qualifies as an attempt. Placing the baby in the bucket in order to 
get rid of it elsewhere later on qualifies as the start of an intended process. 
The fact that the final act of disposal was not successfully completed does 
not mean that no attempt was made. Instead, we can refer to it as a failed 
attempt.  
From a legal point of view, both Burchell27 and Snyman28 distinguish 
between completed and uncompleted attempts.29 Using the words of 
Watermeyer CJ in S v Schoombie,30 Burchell31 defines "attempt" as follows:  
a) the wrongdoer has done everything he or she has set out to do in 
order to commit a crime, but has failed due to a lack of skill or 
foresight, or the presence of an unforeseen obstacle; 
b) the wrongdoer has not been able to do everything he or she has set 
out to do, because the completion of the crime has been prevented 
by the intervention of some external agency.  
                                            
25  Molefe paras 8 and 9.  
26  Oxford University Press 2017 http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/12765?rskey= 
B8ZBhz&result=1#eid. 
27  Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 535. 
28  Snyman Strafreg 283.  
29  Snyman actually identifies three instances, which include the "impossible attempt". 
This happens when X has the intent but not the means to execute his or her plans. 
30  S v Schoombie 1945 AD 541 545-546. 
31  Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 535. 
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In the event of an uncompleted attempt, a court has to gauge to what extent 
an accused's acts amount to or fall short of an attempt.32 As such, the 
question of proximity arises. How close to successful completion does the 
attempt lie? Burchell33 goes on to state that an accused will be accountable 
for an attempt "as soon as he or she does an act in furtherance of that 
intention, no matter how remote the act may be from the completion of the 
crime". Snyman34 argues that a person is guilty of an attempt once it 
becomes clear that he or she – through commissions or omissions – has at 
least started executing the intended crime. However, Burchell's35 opinion 
differs from Snyman’s in the sense that an attempt should have made some 
considerable progress before it can attract liability; in other words, it should 
amount to more than just the start of a process. Both scholars share the 
view that an attempt is more than just preparation.36  
From my perspective, the attempt in Molefe falls within the uncompleted 
category: an intended crime that is interrupted or prevented before the act 
could be completed.37 The accused placed the baby's corpse in the bucket 
temporarily, with the intent of disposing of it permanently. Due to the early 
intervention of the police she could not go ahead with her plans. The 
situation in Smith is similar: the accused placed the body in a suitcase and 
then proceeded to hide the suitcase in another room until she was able to 
remove it from the premises. The defence used the words "temporary 
disposal".38  
Let us play devil's advocate for one second: if the argument so far does not 
suffice and we accept that the body's placement in the bucket does not 
qualify as either disposal or an attempted disposal, then how should we 
describe the situation? If it is not an attempt to conceal the body, should we 
then describe it as a suspended condition? Or should we simply describe 
the situation by reverting to the statement that the baby's body is in a 
bucket? The fact that the accused put the baby's body in the bucket, either 
to conceal it or for easy transport to an intended location, means that a 
process was set in motion. As such, an attempted disposal commenced.  
                                            
32  Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 538. 
33  Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 538. 
34  Snyman Strafreg 283.  
35  Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 538. 
36  Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 61; Snyman Strafreg 283. 
37  Snyman Strafreg 283. 
38  Smith 260. 
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4 How language structures space, according to Talmy39 
In Talmy's conceptual approach to language systems, a distinction should 
be made between two levels. The first and broadest level uses lexical items, 
sentences, paragraphs and larger chunks of discourse to convey 
conceptual content, which may include feelings, ideas and practical 
information.40 The second level consists of closed-class words, which are 
also known as grammatical or function words.41 Called closed-class forms 
because no new meanings or functions can be added to their existing 
meaning or function, these words include pronouns, conjunctions, articles 
and prepositions. The pronoun "he" can refer only to a male in the third 
person singular, unlike the word "apple", which evokes a variety of senses. 
Function words like prepositions can provide us with a great deal of 
additional information. For instance, when scrutinising a sentence such as 
that in 4.1 below, we pay close attention to the prepositions and what they 
tell us about space and motion.  
4.1 The pecan nut tree is next to the house 
We know that the preposition "next to" tells us something about space, 
volume, mass and location.42 The tree is the smaller object; as a result, its 
location is described in terms of the larger object, the house.43 We can 
furthermore infer distance and consequently know that the tree is near the 
house, but not inside it. Likewise, "next to" means that the tree is positioned 
to the left or right of the house, otherwise we would have said that the tree 
is in front of, behind or opposite the house. The tree's location with respect 
to the position of the house similarly tells us something about the boundaries 
of the objects; their geometry.44 If we were to interchange the two objects 
(the house is next to the pecan nut tree), we are not simply left with two 
objects that relate to space; rather, we are confronted with a semantic 
difference. If the house is described in relation to the tree, the implication is 
that the tree is older and better known than the house. The pecan nut tree 
then becomes a very specific point of reference.45  
                                            
39  Talmy Toward a Cognitive Semantics. 
40  Talmy Towards a Cognitive Semantics 178. 
41  Talmy Towards a Cognitive Semantics 178. 
42  Talmy Towards a Cognitive Semantics 180. 
43  Talmy Towards a Cognitive Semantics 182. 
44  Talmy Towards a Cognitive Semantics 182. Also see Vandeloise 2006 "Are There 
Spacial Prepositions?" 141. 
45  See Vandeloise "Are there Spatial Prepositions?" 142. He states that prepositions 
such as these have the function of localising a target by referring to the landmark. 
What he means by this is that one determines and describes the target object's 
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When we consider the preposition in combination with the verb, we realise 
that the objects are stationary; no movement is present. One object is not 
transpositioned from one location to another.46 By contrast, the following 
sentence illustrates motion. 
4.2 James backs the car out of the garage 
In sentence 4.2, aspects such as space, volume and location are still 
present and relevant, but now there is also a conceptual path which 
indicates motion.47 One object is now transpositioned from one location to 
another. We know the car that used to be inside is now in the process of 
moving out and backwards. The preposition gives us a sense of direction. 
Moreover, the main object (the car) is no longer in a state of being 
contained; its location and its relation to the garage are changing. The fact 
that the car is in the process of occupying a new space confirms that an 
ongoing event is taking place.  
Talmy48 uses Gestalt theory in referring to the primary object as "Figure" 
and the secondary object as "Ground". He describes Figure as a "moving 
or conceptually movable entity" whose site or path is the variable value, 
whereas Ground is seen as the reference entity, which mostly has a 
"stationary setting" with respect to the Figure's site or path.49 In sentence 
4.2, the car qualifies as Figure and the garage as Ground. Some of their 
properties are summarised in Table 1.50  
Table 1: Properties of Figure and Ground 
Figure Ground 
Has unknown spatial properties to 
be determined 
Has known properties and acts as 
a reference point which can 
characterise the Figure's unknown 
properties 
                                            
location by using the larger landmark/point of reference. We can say "John is waiting 
behind the church" where the church is the point of reference; however we cannot 
really say "The church is situated behind John's poodle, Jessica"; it would be odd to 
use a dog as a type of landmark, unless there is a well-known statue of Jessica.  
46  Talmy Towards a Cognitive Semantics 180-181. 
47  See Vandeloise "Are there Spatial Prepositions?" 142. 
48  Talmy Towards a Cognitive Semantics 184. 
49  Talmy Towards a Cognitive Semantics 184. 
50  Talmy Towards a Cognitive Semantics 183. 
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More movable More permanently located 
Smaller Larger  
More recently on the scene/more 
recent in awareness 
Earlier on the scene/in memory 
Of greater concern/relevance Of lesser concern/relevance 
Less immediately perceivable More immediately perceivable 
More salient, once perceived More backgrounded, once the 
Figure is perceived 
More dependent More independent 
  
As the Ground, the garage in sentence 4.2 is the larger and more 
permanently located object. A garage is conventionally built before the 
owner's car is bought and is the first of the two objects to be seen, due to 
its size and the fact that the car was parked inside. As cars come and go, 
the garage forms part of an earlier memory. Because the event revolves 
around the car (the Figure), the garage is of lesser concern and moves to 
the background once the car is perceived. However, the car's location is 
determined in relation to that of the garage, which makes the garage more 
independent. It furthermore consists of known properties (height, width, 
length; it has four walls and a roof; it has a large, retractable door) which in 
turn might assist in learning the properties of the car (its height, width, 
length, etc.).  
When applied to the case at hand, the baby's corpse qualifies as the Figure 
and the bucket as the Ground. The body is smaller than the bucket and its 
spatial properties are determined in relation to those of the bucket. Though 
both objects are moveable, the bucket is less moveable with the body in it; 
Hence the accused's risk of being caught. In this scenario the body is moved 
into the bucket (provisionally). The body is also more recently on the scene 
and of greater concern than the bucket. More importantly, the body is less 
immediately perceivable due to its location in the bucket, making the bucket 
the first thing we see before observing the body. Once the body is perceived, 
it becomes more salient than the bucket. The body's whereabouts are 
dependent on the bucket, whereas the bucket's location and geometry are 
not dependent on the baby in it.  
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When applying the properties of Figure and Ground to this case, we not only 
learn something about the geometry of the baby's body but also something 
about space, movement and time. We can illustrate this through the three 
sentences below. In the first two sentences the body's location is stationary, 
but in the third sentence movement is implied. This furthermore implies that 
the bucket (and by extension the accused's house) was the body's first 
location of disposal at that point in time – albeit temporarily.51 Here the 
prepositions aid in determining the object's immediate environment.  
4.3 The body is in/inside a bucket at my house. 
4.4 The body is in/inside a bucket at my house [before I can bury it in 
the back yard]. 
4.5 The body is in/inside an unmarked grave in the veld [after I kept 
it in a bucket for two days]. 
Both of the prepositions "in" and "inside" indicate an enclosure.52 If you say 
that something is in a box or a bucket, you are recalling its geometry, 
specifically its interior.53 If an object is located/positioned within another 
container (object X is to be found in the interior of the container), there is no 
longer an act of seeing but an act of looking, of finding. If, however, object 
X is lying somewhere on the surface, which would be indicated by 
prepositions such as "on top of", "next to", "across from", or "in front of", 
then the act of seeing would be more suitable and looking would be reserved 
for closer inspection. When object X is to be found inside another object 
such as a container, X is not there for all to see. In order to observe the 
contents of the bucket, the police had to look inside the bucket; the contents 
had to be shown to them. In other words, there is a semantic difference 
between "seeing" and "looking". Seeing is a sensory act, whereas looking 
is a cognitive one. It is therefore not just a straightforward issue of the 
                                            
51  We can use the following motion-aspect formulas in Talmy Towards a Cognitive 
Semantics 215, 245-246 to calculate and confirm the stationary nature and location 
of the body. The relevant formulas for that case look like this: 
1) a POINTS BELOC AT a POINTS, FOR an BEXTENTT. 
2) a POINTS BELOC AT a POINTS that IS OF the INSIDE OF [AN ENCLOSURE]. 
52  Talmy Towards a Cognitive Semantics 194.  
53  Talmy "How Language Structures Space" 246. The use of prepositions is not 
restricted to geometry, of course. They are connected to an object's functional 
attributes too; in the instance of a bucket, the usage extends to holding, constraining, 
collecting and carrying; see Feist 2010 "Inside In and On" 97, 102, 104, and 
Vandeloise "Are there Spatial Prepositions?" 140, 143. The prepositions will change 
when the object is used for something other than its prototypical function. For 
example, when someone utilises a bucket as a stepladder, the preposition will 
change from "in" to "on".  
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object’s visibility. When a person has to actively look at/for something, the 
object is hidden from plain sight. Considering that the accused intended to 
dispose of the body and that the body's location was not on top of a surface 
rendering it easily visible, the act of concealment should be obvious.54 The 
body was hidden and not clearly visible. If the accused had not intended or 
attempted to hide the baby's corpse, there would have been no reason to 
place it inside a container. She could then have placed it on any given 
surface like her bed or a table "for all to see". 
5  New criteria for the interpretation of "disposal" 
It is common practice within many legal systems to interpret words 
according to their ordinary meaning, when those words are not defined by 
the legislator.55 Admittedly, as with "reasonable person", the concept of 
ordinary meaning remains elusive and problematic.56 As Hutton57 points out, 
what is ordinary to one person is not necessarily ordinary to the next. 
Nevertheless, ordinary meaning is often seen as the popular, 
straightforward meaning of words, or (regrettably) their dictionary 
meaning.58 We understand ordinary meaning as being the opposite of 
technical, jargon-filled and scientifically precise language. Slocum59 
describes ordinary meaning as texts having to be "understood by different 
people in the same way"; this must include the general public as well as 
legal practitioners. Ordinary meaning furthermore places a limitation on a 
court's ability to interpret words, especially if they come across as clear and 
unambiguous.60 Unless a legal term exists or the definition of a word does 
not fit the context, a court may not veer from a word's ordinary meaning.61  
                                            
54  Bear in mind a bucket's function as a carrying vessel. In Smith, the suitcase is 
considered a place of disposal, partly because it was used as a transportation 
device. See Snyman Strafreg 432, fn 230.  
55  Hutton Word Meaning 26-27. 
56  Hutton Word Meaning 44. 
57  Hutton Word Meaning 56. He goes on to describe ordinary meaning as a legal fiction; 
also see Du Plessis Re-interpretation of Statutes 199. Similar arguments have been 
made by Labuschagne 1988 SAPR 34; Labuschagne 1989 SAPR 208; 
Labuschagne 1998 SAPR 146; Cowen 1980 THRHR 386 and Devenish 
Interpretation of Statutes 26. 
58  Du Plessis Re-interpretation of Statutes 199. See furthermore the contribution by 
Carney and Bergh 2014 LitNet Akademies on the misapprehension that ordinary 
meaning is equal to a dictionary definition. 
59  Slocum Ordinary Meaning 3. 
60  Carney and Bergh 2014 LitNet Akademies 31. 
61  Hutton Word Meaning 41; Devenish Interpretation of Statutes 242. This is also 
known as the golden rule, which became cemented in South African case law by 
means of Venter v R 1907 TS 1910. 
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Though it falls within a court's authority and responsibility to decide which 
words are ordinary words and which are terms of art,62 and also to 
extend/broaden a word's meaning to give better effect to a relevant 
statute,63 the technical term should always be a trustworthy preference. The 
chosen criteria by which a word's meaning is extended or newly defined 
should therefore be clear and watertight.  
By introducing the two criteria for interpreting "disposal", Pittman JP turned 
the contested word into a technical legal term, which he probably did in 
favour of the accused. In doing this, a court no longer understands 
"disposal" within the boundaries of its ordinary meaning, as can be seen by 
Rabie J's application of the same criteria. As has been suggested earlier, 
the court's two criteria for disposal are linguistically vague, rendering them 
problematic. When faced with criteria that come across as forced and 
linguistically unsound, what would be a better solution? The two options 
would be either to revert to the word's ordinary meaning (the ideal option) 
or to retain its status as legal term, but with new criteria.  
As mentioned before, the criteria put forward by Rabie J are those 
suggested by Pittman JP. In contrast to Rabie and Pittman's view, Searle J 
considered the accused's actions in Smith as a "secret disposing of the dead 
body"64 and did not base his decision on a specific set of criteria; rather he 
used the facts of the case to determine if disposal took place. The suitcase 
in which the body was concealed and was later transported to different 
locations sufficed as a place of disposal. The fact that the secret was 
revealed that same evening did not revoke the status of disposal. There is 
no mention of permanence or visibility. The temporality of the concealment 
does not raise questions of attempt or disposal and, as with the box in Dema 
and the bucket in Molefe, anyone would have been able to open the suitcase 
and see its content if they so wished.  
What could be alternative criteria for the lexeme "disposal" with regard to 
the context of intentional concealment? In keeping with what we already 
know of its ordinary meaning, I offer these two (rather simple) criteria, 
namely containment and movement. They can be illustrated in the following 
questions: 
                                            
62  I agree with Hutton Word Meaning 41-42, that the boundary between ordinary and 
legal meaning remains problematic, making clear distinctions difficult.  
63  Article 1 of the Interpretation Act 33 of 1957; also see Devenish Interpretation of 
Statutes 241. 
64  Smith 260. 
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a) Can we easily (that is, immediately or without much effort) see the 
body?  
b) Was the body placed in a location other than that in which the person 
died?  
Both these questions are closed-ended. If we answer "yes" to the first and 
"no" to the second question, then the body was not disposed of. The reverse 
is true for bodies that were disposed of.  
The first criterion brings us back to the difference between the verbs "see" 
and "look". If it is a matter of searching for something, then the object is no 
longer in plain sight. Once the preposition in/inside becomes relevant, we 
are dealing with the concealment of (or attempt to conceal) a crime.65 Also, 
we can then describe the dead body in terms of its place of disposal, its 
containment or Figure and Ground relations.  
The second criterion, which is directly connected to the first, may describe 
a conceptual path. If a woman gave birth to a stillborn baby at her house, 
on her bed, and left the baby right there, the location remains static; no 
concealment is present. However, if she panicked and placed its body under 
her bed, inside her closet, behind her TV console, or in a shallow grave – 
even if only temporarily – to conceal what had just happened to her, the 
body has been transported from one location to the next. In order to conceal 
the event the object's location is no longer kept static.  
My criteria correspond with the presiding officers' initial understanding that 
if a body is there for all to see it has not been disposed of. The difference 
between our interpretations lies with the movement and containment of the 
body, regardless of the duration of time. A court has to consider both criteria. 
For instance, if a person wants to conceal a dead body, the person will not 
remove it from one surface, like a bed or a table, and place it on top of a 
similar surface close by. This would be odd. In such a case movement might 
have taken place, but with no to little effect. We can still easily see the body, 
which means that containment has not taken place.  
What if a body were placed inside a container that is either transparent or 
very shallow? What if a body were deliberately dumped in a larger space 
such as a forest, in the bushveld or on a beach? Concerning the first 
                                            
65  Of course, this does not apply to situations where someone died inside a container 
by accident, unless the murderer chose the container as both the place of death and 
that of concealment.  
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question, containment is determined by seeing versus looking. If the content 
of a container is easily visible, then containment is not present. Regarding 
the second question, we are once more led by the semantics of the 
prepositions involved. We do not walk "on" the field or swim "on" the lake or 
hike "on" the forest. A person goes hiking "in" a forest; he or she is contained 
by it. A forest is something you enter. A body in a veld, a forest or a lake is 
usually visible only to those who happen upon it or search for it. It is placed 
in these locations because it will not be easily seen or found. In fact, when 
the police suspect that a body might be in a field or forest, they use search 
parties and detection dogs to help them find it. The same cannot be said for 
a body that was left on a beach or in a clearing. A beach is something you 
walk or sit "on", which renders it easily visible, at least more so than would 
be the case with a dead body in a forest. A beach or a cleared piece of land 
should rather be seen as a surface, which does not contain. However, if a 
person did not die on the beach, but his or her body was taken there, then 
movement in service of concealment of the crime was clearly present.  
6  Conclusion 
Language is the legal profession's most important vehicle; unfortunately, it 
is not always its friend. Because the meaning of words is infamously 
ambiguous, indefinable and often troublesome, it is probably better to keep 
things as simple as possible. Section 113(2) of the General Law 
Amendment Act defines neither "dispose" nor "concealment", but it offers 
"lawful burial order" as a contextual antonym of the two words mentioned 
here above. From this we can infer that if someone does away with a body 
in a manner that does not qualify as a legal burial, the action most probably 
meets the requirements of disposal.  
From a linguistic perspective, based on the contextual meaning of 
"disposal", the accused did try to conceal the birth of her child by disposing 
of its body. The bucket became the first instance of disposal. She removed 
the body from where it was stillborn and deliberately placed it inside a bucket 
to hide it from wandering eyes. She disposed of its body temporarily with 
the intention of getting rid of it somewhere else. In the Smith case, the court 
found the accused guilty with a strong recommendation for mercy, indicating 
that the court had sympathy for what had happened to the accused. We get 
the impression that the presiding officers in Dema and Molefe wanted to be 
equally merciful by indicating that the accused had not transgressed any 
law. However, the accused in Dema and Molefe did break the law. 
Assigning the two criteria to the word "disposal" may have been a somewhat 
clumsy and excessive way of being lenient. Linguistically, it makes more 
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sense to study words conceptually and within their context than to add to 
their meaning, especially when their conventional meaning can do the work 
equally well. 
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